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Pleading for Justice: The Availability
of Plea Bargaining as a Method of
Alternative Dispute Resolution at the
International Criminal Court
Kate Kovarovic*
The entire legal profession ... has become so mesmerized with the stimulation of the
courtroom contest, that we tend to forget that we ought to be healers-healers of conflicts.
Chief Justice Warren Burger*
I. INTRODUCTION
Though its exact parameters are unclear, the field of international criminal
law (ICL) typically extends to those perpetrators of crimes so heinous as to consti-
tute an attack against the entire international community.' Historically the interna-
tional community has responded to the conduct of such perpetrators by creating
special tribunals to preside over their trials. Given the scope and nature of these
crimes, these tribunals are created with the dual goals of achieving both peace in
the existing conflict region and justice for the victims, as "[i]t is understood that
no lasting peace can be achieved without justice .... 2
Two of the more prominent international criminal courts, the International
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International Crimi-
nal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), initially barred the use of plea bargaining from
their courtroom procedures after deeming the process to be inconsistent with these
goals. This assertion by the ICTY and the ICTR (collectively the Tribunals) gar-
nered widespread support throughout the international community, as many be-
lieved that "the gravity of the crimes within the jurisdiction of international crimi-
nal courts prohibits any negotiations with the alleged perpetrators." 3 However,
* Kovarovic received her Juris Doctor from American University's Washington College of Law in
May 2011, and will receive her Master of Arts in International Affairs/Security in December 2011.
She has published multiple articles on issues of international law and security including the ticking
time bomb exception to torture, the national security exception to free speech, and the liability of
private corporations assisting with extraordinary rendition flights.
** Warren E. Burger, Chief Justice, The State of Justice, 70 A.B.A. J. 62, 66 (1984).
1. For example, the crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes.
2. Regina E. Rauxloh, Negotiated History: The Historical Record in International Criminal Law
and Plea Bargaining, 10 INT'L CRIM. L. REV. 739, 740 (2010) (referencing the frequently cited dis-
senting opinion of Prosecutor v. Deronjie, in which Judge Schomburg stated, "However, there is no
peace without justice; there is no justice without truth, meaning the entire truth and nothing but the
truth.") [hereinafter Rauxloh's Negotiated History]. See Prosecutor v. Deronjid, Case No. IT-02-61-S,
Dissenting Opinion of Judge Wolfgang Schomburg, 6 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia
Mar. 30, 2004).
3. Regina E. Rauxloh, Plea Bargaining in International Criminal Justice: Can the International
Criminal Court Afford to Avoid Trials?, I J. CRIM. JUST. RES. 1, 2 (2011), available at
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both Tribunals quickly became overburdened by the unique challenges of hosting
such trials to the extent their capacity to achieve both peace and justice was hin-
dered.
As a result, both the ICTY and the ICTR restructured their courtroom proc-
esses to allow for the use of plea bargaining as an alternative method of dispute
resolution. In doing so, the Tribunals highlighted the relatively similar goals be-
tween international adjudication and alternative dispute resolution (ADR), as both
systems are "linked by common concerns, such as fairness, ensuring that partici-
pants have a voice in the dispute resolution process, and guaranteeing procedural
justice."4 Thus while the Tribunals' early "desire for voice, control, and proce-
dural justice [often] manifested itself in the creation of trials,"5 both came to dem-
onstrate that these desires could be equally achieved through a closely regulated
plea bargaining process.
However, the debate regarding the availability of plea bargaining was later
renewed when the international community sought to replace conflict-based tribu-
nals with a permanent criminal court. This led to the creation of the International
Criminal Court (ICC) in 2002, which represented a permanent international court
with jurisdiction over "the most serious crimes of concern to the international
community as a whole." 6 While at first the ICC made no definitive assertions
regarding plea bargaining, the issue was briefly addressed in the text of the
Court's founding treaty, the Rome Statute. Article 65(5) of the Rome Statute
holds: "Any discussions between the Prosecutor and the defence regarding modi-
fication of the charges, the admission of guilt or the penalty to be imposed shall
not be binding on the Court."7 Accordingly, the Court neither explicitly allows nor
forbids the use of plea bargaining; rather it simply reserves the Court's right "not
[to be] bound by such agreements." 8
Despite its reservations, the potential benefits of permitting plea bargains at
the ICC far outweigh the potential costs. The histories of both the ICTY and the
ICTR reveal the substantial advantages to incorporating plea bargaining into the
international criminal adjudication process, suggesting that this methodology
would be similarly beneficial at the ICC. Though the Tribunals lack continuity in
their use of plea bargaining, the ICC must look only to the principles of ADR for
guidance. The methodology of dispute systems design (DSD) provides a frame-
work in which the ICC can devise a structure of dispute resolution centered on the
plea bargaining process. Furthermore, given that plea bargaining functions as a
form of negotiation, the ICC can utilize the principles of ADR to implement a
high-functioning system consistent with the goals of both international adjudica-
tion and dispute resolution.
http://www.icjrc.org/yahoo-site admin/assets/docs/RM291 Ill FinalVersion byJCJR forPublicati
on I 1.43105037.pdf [hereinafter Rauxloh's Plea Bargaining].
4. Andrea Kupfer Schneider, Bargaining in the Shadow of International Law: What the Normaliza-
tion of Adjudication in International Governance Regimes Means for Dispute Resolution, 41 N.Y.U. J.
INT' L L. & POL. 789, 790 (2009).
5. Id. at 797.
6. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 5, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90, avail-
able at http://untreaty.un.org/codlicc/statute/romefra.htm [hereinafter Rome Statute].
7. Id. art. 65(5).
8. Rauxloh's Plea Bargaining, supra note 3, at 19.
284 [Vol. 2011
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Thus this article serves to illustrate how the implementation of a plea bargain-
ing process at the ICC would enable the Court to achieve both peace and justice.
Part II begins by analyzing the history of plea bargaining in the international
criminal arena, using the ICTY and the ICTR as models of the successful incorpo-
ration of plea bargaining into a court's adjudication process. Part III transfers
these advantages to the ICC by examining how the plea bargaining process would
advance the Court's goals of achieving peace and justice. Part IV moves from the
theoretical to the practical by analyzing how the principles of ADR provide a
framework for establishing a functional plea bargaining process at the ICC. Fi-
nally, Part V provides conclusive remarks about the role of plea bargaining in
attaining peace and justice at the ICC.
II. THE HISTORY OF PLEA BARGAINING IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
There is little debate regarding the importance of plea bargaining in the
United States' (U.S.) criminal system,9 as roughly 90% of such cases are "dis-
posed of by a guilty plea secured through plea bargaining . . . [and such] high
guilty plea rates are commonly believed necessary in order for the system to func-
tion."' However, the international community has long been reluctant to transfer
this approach to its own legal systems. Opponents of the process argue that the
very nature of ICL prohibits the use of plea bargaining, as the "crimes within the
[Tribunals'] jurisdiction [aire simply . . . too reprehensible to be bargained
over."' Others believe that trials provide a better forum for victims' recovery, as
"[i]n disputes focused on human rights, the creation of trials-both prosecutions
dealing with war crimes and cases brought by individuals against their govern-
ment for violations-gives voice to individuals."' 2
Such mentalities dominated the field of ICL during the formative years of
early international criminal tribunals. Prompted by the violent conflicts in the
former Yugoslavia and Rwanda during the early 1990s, the United Nations (UN)
identified ad hoc criminal tribunals as the most effective legal forums in which
perpetrators of gross atrocities could be brought to justice. These courts were de-
signed with limited, conflict-based jurisdiction.
The first of these tribunals was the ICTY, created in 1993.1 The Tribunal was
initially resolute in its condemnation of plea bargaining as antithetical to its goals
of peace and justice, and its judges asserted the inapplicability of plea bargaining
before hearing their first case. In announcing its Rules of Procedure and Evidence
(RPE), then-President Antonio Cassese explained the rationale of the Tribunal in
rejecting the use of plea bargaining:
9. Rauxloh's Negotiated History, supra note 2, at 741 ("[it is often claimed that a modem criminal
justice system would collapse it if were not for the fact that the majority of trials are replaced by in-
formal negotiations.").
10. Nancy Amoury Combs, Copping a Plea to Genocide: The Plea Bargaining of International
Crimes, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 19 (2002).
I1. Michael P. Scharf, Trading Justice for Efficiency: Plea-Bargaining and International Tribunals,
2 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 1070, 1071 (2004).
12. Schneider, supra note 4, at 798.
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[W]e always have to keep in mind that this Tribunal is not a municipal
criminal court but one that is charged with the task of trying persons ac-
cused of the gravest of all crimes. The persons appearing before us will
be charged with genocide, torture, murder, sexual assault, wanton de-
struction, persecution and other inhumane acts. After due reflection, we
have decided that no one should be immune from prosecution for crimes
14
such as these ....
In the years following this declaration the Tribunal increasingly struggled to man-
age its caseload given the growing involvement of the international community in
arresting and transferring indictees.15 The court was inundated with new cases but
found that it was unprepared to host complete trials for all its defendants. Thus
just seven years after Cassese's declaration, the ICTY changed course and "began
to aggressively pursue plea bargains"l6 as a way to manage its docket.
While two other defendants pled guilty before him,' 7 it was Stevan Todorovi6
who first engaged in the plea bargaining process at the ICTY. Todorovi6 was in-
dicted with four other defendants for committing atrocities including crimes
against humanity, grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions, and violations of
the laws and customs of war.' 8 Although all five defendants pled not guilty and
prepared for trial, Todorovid possessed a bargaining chip which the others did not,
as he had allegedly been injured by North American Treaty Organization (NATO)
forces during his detention and transport." Thus
[w]hile the case was pending . . . Todorovid and the prosecution negoti-
ated a plea agreement. Pursuant to the plea agreement, Todorovid pled
guilty to one count of persecution as a crime against humanity, promised
to testify against his co-defendants and in other proceedings . . . and
14. Scharf, supra note 11, at 1073, IT/29 (citing a Statement by the President [of the ICTY] made at
a Briefing to Members of Diplomatic Missions).
15. Rauxloh's Negotiated History, supra note 2, at 745 (explaining that during this time, the interna-
tional community began offering financial incentives to Balkan authorities for transferring indictees to
the Tribunal and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization [NATO] also agreed to arrest indictees).
16. Scharf, supra note 11, at 1073.
17. Draien Erdemovi6 entered the first guilty plea before the ICTY. Erdemovi6's case is unique in
that the defendant was not being actively sought by the Tribunal when he voluntarily contacted the
court and offered extensive assistance with its investigations. The Trial Chamber ultimately sentenced
Erdemovi6 to five years' imprisonment, while noting "the benefits that a guilty plea affords to the
Tribunal . . . ." Combs, supra note 10, at 114; See Prosecutor v. Erdemovi6, Case No. IT-96-22-T,
Sentencing Judgment, 1 23 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Mar. 5, 1998). Goran Jelisi6
was the second defendant to plead guilty before the Tribunal, but "the case did not involve a plea
bargain because Jelisi6 got nothing in return for his plea." Instead prosecutors told Jelisi6 that a guilty
plea would not affect their decision to seek the harshest available sentence, and Jelisi6 was eventually
sentenced to forty years' imprisonment. Combs, supra note 10 at 117; See Prosecutor v. Jelisi6, Case
No. IT-95-10-T, Judgment, 1124 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 14, 1999).
18. Prosecutor v. Simi6, Case No. IT-95-9-PT, Second Amended Indictment, ll 29-30, 34, 38, & 40-
47 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Mar. 25 1999).
19. See Combs, supra note 10, at 118 ("Todorovi6 pled not guilty to the counts and prepared, along
with his co-defendant, for trial. Unlike his co-defendants, however, Todorovi6 held a bargaining chip -
the ability to embarrass NATO - that would assist him in obtaining sentencing concessions. Todorovid
had been captured by four bounty hunters while in his home . . . [and] was allegedly dealt a heavy
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withdrew his motions challenging the legality of his arrest. The prosecu-
tion, for its part, withdrew the remaining twenty-six counts and agreed to
recommend to the Trial Chamber a prison sentence of between five and
twelve years. Both parties agreed not to appeal any sentence imposed by
the Trial Chamber within that range, and both parties agreed that if either
side did not fulfil its end of the bargain, the plea agreement would be dis-
solved and the case would proceed to trial. Todorovi6 thus represents the
first ICTY case to expressly feature plea bargaining.20
While the terms of this plea agreement certainly worked in the defendant's favor,
it is also true that "Todorovi6 took a risk." 21 The Trial Chamber was not obligated
to accommodate these terms in sentencing the defendant, and Todorovid could
easily have received a sentence far outside the scope of this agreement.
In acknowledging the usefulness of plea bargaining in Todorovi6's case, the
ICTY sought to better enable its prosecutors to utilize this practice in later cases,
as well. Although the court's founding statute did not explicitly address the issue
of plea bargaining, it did authorize the Tribunals' judges to adopt their own RPE.22
In 1997 the ICTY attached a provision to its RPE relating to the practice of plea
bargaining which read:
If an accused pleads guilty in accordance with Rule 62 (vi), or requests to
change his or her plea to guilty and the Trial Chamber is satisfied that:
(i) the guilty plea has been made voluntarily;
(ii) the guilty plea is informed;
(iii) the guilty plea is not equivocal; and
(iv) there is a sufficient factual basis for the crime and the accused's
participation in it, either on the basis of independent indicia or on
lack of any material disagreement between the parties about the facts
of the case,
the Trial Chamber may enter a finding of guilt and instruct the Registrar
to set a date for the sentencing hearing. 23
Upon the implementation of this provision plea bargaining became increasingly
popular at the Tribunal and as of 2009 some twenty defendants had pled guilty
before the ICTY, most of whom engaged the prosecutors in negotiations before
entering their pleas.24
20. Id. at 119-20.
21. Id. at 142.
22. ICTY Statute, supra note 13, art. 15 ("The judges of the International Tribunal shall adopt rules
of procedure and evidence for the conduct of the pre-trial phase of the proceedings, trials and appeals,
the admission of evidence, the protection of victims and witnesses and other appropriate matters.").
23. Rules of Procedure and Evidence, U.N. ICTY, U.N. Doc. IT/32/Rev. 45, Rule 62 bis (Dec. 8,
2010), available at http://www.icty.org/x/file/Legal%20Library/Rules-procedure evidence/
ITO32Rev45_en.pdf [hereinafter ICTY RPE].
24. Janine Natalya Clark, Plea Bargaining at the ICTY Guilty Pleas and Reconciliation, 20 EUR. J.
INT'L L. 415, 415 (2009).
No. 2] 287
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As the second ad hoc criminal tribunal created by the UN, the ICTR' S25 his-
tory with plea bargaining closely mimics that of the ICTY's. Despite its initial
hesitation to incorporate the practice into its procedures, the Tribunal fell victim to
similar constraints as the ICTY in managing its docket. Accordingly, the ICTR
revised its rules and included as Rule 62(B):
(B) If an accused pleads guilty in accordance with Rule 62 (A)(v), or re-
quests to change his plea to guilty, the Trial Chamber shall satisfy itself
that the guilty plea:
(i) is made freely and voluntarily;
(ii) is an informed plea;
(iii) is unequivocal; and
(iv) is based on sufficient facts for the crime and accused's participa-
tion in it, either on the basis of objective indicia or of lack of any
material disagreement between the parties about the facts of the
case. Thereafter the Trial Chamber may enter a finding of guilt and
instruct the Registrar to set a date for the sentencing hearing.26
Regardless of this provision, the ICTR struggled more than the ICTY to incorpo-
rate the practice of plea bargaining into its procedures. 27
This is reflected in the Tribunal's history with defendants who have pled
guilty. The first two defendants to have pled guilty before the ICTR, Jean Kam-
banda and Omar Serushago, voluntarily offered their cooperation to the court in
anticipation of receiving sentencing leniency in return. However, the prosecutors
in both cases informed the defendants that no concessions would be made despite
their assistance.28 Instead it was Georges Ruggiu, the third defendant to have pled
guilty before the court, who prosecutors first engaged in plea negotiations.
As with Kambanda and Serushago, Ruggiu was told by prosecutors that they
could make no guarantees about his final sentence.29 However, prosecutors agreed
to work with foreign authorities to ensure the safety of Ruggiu's family in ex-
25. S.C. Res. 955, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/RES/955, at 1 (Nov. 8, 1994).
26. Rules of Procedure and Evidence, U.N. ICTR, U.N. Doc. ITR/3/Rev. 1, Rule 62(B) (Mar. 14,
2008), available at http://www.unictr.org/Portals/O/EnglishlLegal/Evidance/English/080314.pdf [here-
inafter ICTR RPE].
27. Rauxloh's Negotiated History, supra note 2, at 742 (noting that the ICTR serves as "one of the
very few examples where the Tribunal and the Prosecution have not succeeded in establishing plea
bargaining as a widely used practice.").
28. In Kambanda's case, the plea agreement stated that "no agreements, understandings or prom-
ises" had been made with regards to his sentencing. Prosecutor v. Kambanda, Case No. ICTR-97-23-S,
Judgment and Sentence, 48 (Sept. 4, 1998). Furthermore, Serushago in his agreement acknowledged
that "sentencing is at the entire discretion of the Trial Chamber," as the prosecution made no guaran-
tees as to its sentencing recommendation. Combs, supra note 10, at 134 (citing Prosecutor v. Se-
rushago, Case No. ICTR-98-37, Plea Agreement Between Omar Serushago and the Office of the
Prosecutor, 40 (Dec. 4, 1998)).
29. Prosecutor v. Ruggiu, Case No. ICTR-97-32, Transcript, IN 10-12 (May 15, 2000) (recording
Ruggiu's acknowledgement that he received no sentencing guarantees in exchange for his guilty plea).
[Vol. 2011288
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change for his continued cooperation. 30 Such unprecedented collaboration be-
tween parties seemingly won the approval of the court. In issuing Ruggiu's sen-
tencing judgment in June 2000, the Trial Chamber's "view of guilty pleas
seem[ed] to have evolved" 31 as it asserted that guilty pleas would be met by sen-
tencing discounts: "[I]t is good policy in criminal matters that some form of con-
sideration be shown towards those who have confessed their guilty, in order to
encourage other suspects and perpetrators of crimes to come forward."32
As both the ICTY and the ICTR have "[come] to endorse plea bargaining," 33
they have also helped to determine the meaning of the term in the context of ICL.
While there is not one universally accepted definition of "plea bargaining," the
practice as embodied by these two Tribunals refers to the negotiation process
whereby a prosecutor makes certain concessions in exchange for a defendant's
guilty plea.34 In the context of ICL, plea bargaining often falls into one of two
categories. The first is charge bargaining, where a prosecutor offers to drop certain
charges if the defendant will plead guilty to the remaining ones.3 5 The second is
sentence bargaining, where the prosecutor offers to recommend a more lenient
sentence in exchange for the defendant's guilty plea.36
In utilizing such practices, the Tribunals drastically modified the methodolo-
gies of international criminal courts. Upon their creation, the UN asserted that the
ICTY and the ICTR possessed critical differences from their domestic counter-
parts:
Chief among these differences is the purpose they were designed to
serve. Rather than focusing on the traditional objectives of criminal law
(retribution, prevention, rehabilitation and deterrence), the Security
Council stipulated that the major purpose of the ad hoc international
criminal courts was to contribute to the restoration and maintenance of
peace and the rule of law in [the conflict regions].37
Nevertheless, many international scholars found the Tribunals as originally de-
signed "to bear more affinity to adversarial systems."38 However, "amendments to
30. See Combs, supra note 10, at 138 n. 642 (referencing Prosecutor v. Ruggiu, Case No. ICTR-97-
32-DP. Plea Aereement Between Georges Ruggiu and the Office of the Prosecutor, 1 226 (May 12,
2000)).
31. Combs, supra note 10, at 138.
32, Prosecutor v. Ruggiu, Case No. ICTR-97-31-, Judgment and Sentence, 155 (June 1, 2000).
33. Combs, supra note 10, at 145.
34. Scharf, supra note I1, at 1070 ("[Tlhe practice may encompass negotiation over reduction of
sentence, dropping some or all of the charges or reducing the charges in return for admitting guilty,
conceding certain facts, foregoing an appeal or providing cooperation in another criminal case."); see
also Combs, supra note 10, at 4 ("[T]he term most typically refers to the prosecutor's offer of some
form of sentencing concessions in exchange for the defendant's guilty plea.").
35. See Rauxloh's Plea Bargaining, supra note 3, at 5 ("Charge bargaining means that the Prosecu-
tion offers to drop some charges if the defendant pleads guilty to the remaining ones."); see also
Scharf, supra note 11, at 1074 (referring to one case before the ICTY in which "the plea-bargains
included the dropping of charges in return for the guilty plea (charge bargaining).").
36. See Scharf, supra note 11, at 1074 ("Initially, plea-bargains before the two ad hoc international
Tribunals involved promises by the prosecutor to recommend a more lenient sentence in exchange for
a guilty plea and substantial cooperation provided by the defendant (sentence bargaining).").
37. Id. at 1072.
38. Combs, supra note 10, at 70.
No. 2] Pleading for Justice 289
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the rules . . . [then] tilted the balance in the other direction," 39 as the Tribunals
began adopting more "non-adversarial features in an effort to simplify and expe-
dite proceedings."40 Among these added non-adversarial features was that of plea
bargaining.
The integration of this non-adversarial approach has greatly benefited the Tri-
bunals, as plea bargaining better manages the resources of the courts and thus
extends their judicial reach to a greater number of perpetrators. As a result, the
Tribunals' dual goals of promoting peace and justice have been greatly facilitated
by their use of plea bargaining. Despite evidence to this point, the ICC has yet to
adopt similar practices as the ICTY and the ICTR. However, the ICC is increas-
ingly facing similar challenges to those that first compelled the ICTY and the
ICTR to allow for the practice of plea bargaining.
III. THE BENEFITS TO PLEA BARGAINING AT THE INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL COURT
The confinement of the ICTY and the ICTR to specific regional conflicts
eventually compelled the international community to create a permanent judicial
forum. That forum was the ICC, which represents the first permanent, treaty-based
international criminal court. Although the Court has yet to take a definitive stance
on the use of plea bargaining, it has impliedly rejected the application of this doc-
trine to its own cases through prosecutors' refusal to engage in the process. How-
ever, the histories of the ICTY and the ICTR reveal that "[t]he Tribunals . .. have
a functional need for alternative methods of case disposition,"41 and that one of
the more effective methods of such case disposition is that of plea bargaining.
Despite the ICC's failure to engage in negotiations thus far, the Rome Statute
neither explicitly requires nor forbids plea bargaining in its cases. Instead, Rule 65
acknowledges that plea agreements may exist between prosecutors and defense
attorneys but relieves the Court from the duty to abide by such agreements:
1. Where the accused makes an admission of guilt pursuant to article 64,
paragraph 8 (a), the Trial Chamber shall determine whether:
(a) The accused understands the nature and consequences of the ad-
mission of guilt;
(b) The admission is voluntarily made by the accused after sufficient
consultation with defence counsel; and
(c) The admission of guilt is supported by the facts of the case that
are contained in:
(i) The charges brought by the Prosecutor and admitted by the
accused;
39. Id.
40. Id. at 71.
41. Id. at 102.
[Vol. 2011290
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(ii) Any materials presented by the Prosecutor which supple-
ment the charges and which the accused accepts; and
(iii) Any other evidence, such as the testimony of witnesses,
presented by the Prosecutor or the accused ...
5. Any discussions between the Prosecutor and the defence regarding
modification of the charges, the admission of guilt or the penalty to be
imposed shall not be binding on the Court.42
Accordingly, the ICC currently possesses the capacity to engage in plea bargain-
ing with its defendants. Given that this process is compliant with the express pur-
poses of ICL and benefits the Court's ability to achieve both peace and justice, the
plea bargaining process should be made available on a voluntary basis at the ICC.
A. The Purposes of International Criminal Law
While there are similarities between the two systems, the founding principles
of domestic criminal law cannot be so easily transplanted into the international
forum:
International criminal law regularly needs to operate in a situation where
a country or a region has been completely unsettled by armed conflict.
Often crime has not just been a single act of deviant behaviour outside
the rule of society but has become the rule itself, sanctioned and ordered
by those in the most powerful positions in society, whether they are po-
litical, military, religious, or economic leaders. Victimisation of groups
has become the standard; the rule of law has broken down and in most
cases, the violent conflict ... is still ongoing.43
Thus despite the similarities between domestic and international criminal law,"
ICL is designed to accomplish several unique goals, as well.
These goals have been isolated by academic Regina Rauxloh, who asserts that
international criminal law seeks primarily to:
(1) Replace impunity with accountability;
(2) break the internal cycle of ethnic violence;
(3) facilitate reconciliation; and
(4) bring perpetrators to justice in a fair trial, thus restoring the rule of
law.45
42. Rome Statute, supra note 6, art. 65.
43. Rauxloh's Plea Bargaining, supra note 3, at 2-3.
44. Id. at 3 ("[Bloth domestic and international systems strive for justice, deterrence, retribution and
restoration....").
45. Id. ("[ICL] aims for replacing impunity with accountability, breaking the cycle of ethnic vio-
lence and retribution, facilitating reconciliation, and bringing the guilty to justice in a fair trial and thus
restoring the rule of law.").
No. 2] 291
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Rauxloh further suggests that to achieve these goals, the ICL system must:
(1) Balance individual justice with the general establishment of peace
and reconciliation by supporting the reconstruction of the affected soci-
ety;
(2) create an extensive and objective historical record of the atrocities
committed;
(3) emphasize liability of individual perpetrators rather than entire politi-
cal, ethnic, or racial groups to better aid the reconstruction of society; and
(4) provide a forum for victims. 46
Ultimately these goals derive from the dual purposes of international criminal
tribunals to achieve both peace and justice.
B. The Promotion of International Criminal Law Through Plea
Bargaining
Critics of plea bargaining in international tribunals argue that the process de-
tracts from the goals of peace and justice. However, a more thorough analysis
reveals that the use of plea bargaining in ICL actually promotes these goals and
accordingly benefits the entire system.
1. Plea Bargaining Preserves Judicial Resources
Trials presiding over breaches of ICL are "inherently complicated, lengthy
and costly." 47 This is due largely to the complexity of proving that such crimes as
genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity have occurred. Establishing
both the existence of such crimes and the defendant's participation in those crimes
"requires the introduction of hundreds of exhibits and the testimony of dozens of
both eye witnesses and expert witnesses." 48 Trial participants-including wit-
nesses, defendants, and court staff-must all be offered appropriate security, and
all of their transportation and communication needs must be addressed. As such,
hearings must often be translated to a number of languages which requires inter-
preters, translators and adequate technological equipment for all members of the
46. Id. ("Accordingly the court has to not only provide individual case justice but in addition con-
tribute to the establishment of peace and reconciliation between the conflicting parties and support the
reconstruction of the transitional society. Furthermore, the international criminal trial is expected to
build an extensive and objective historical record that discloses 'the way in which the people had been
manipulated by their leaders into committing acts of savagery on a mass scale' so that the cycle of
violence can be broken and repetition of the conflict avoided. In addition it is hoped that the condem-
nation of individuals, rather than political, ethical or racial groups, offer a political catharsis and help
the new government to distan[ce] itself from the discredited past and reconstruct a new society. An-
other objective, which plays a growing role in domestic criminal procedures, but is even more impor-
tant in the international arena as part of the peace process, is to provide a forum for the many victims.
Victims need to be given a voice in the proceedings but also offered protection to be able to participate
without putting themselves or their families into danger.").
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defense and prosecution teams, court employees including judges and clerks, de-
fendants, and witnesses. 49 Proceedings must also be broadcast, which requires
further sophisticated equipment allowing for the filming, recording, and playback
of hearings.
As a result, trials at the ICTY and the ICTR generally take over one full year
to complete, and can cost upwards of $50 million.5 0 This estimate does not include
the time spent gathering evidence and preparing for trial, nor does it include the
time spent on sentencing appeals. As the ICC is a fairly new legal body, a simi-
larly detailed trial profile is not yet available. However, one can reasonably expect
that its trial lengths and costs are comparable to, if not greater than, those of pre-
vious tribunals.
This presumption is supported by the ICC's budget, which in 2010 totaled
C103,607,900' (approximately $137,327,000).52 The majority of this money was
earmarked for trial-related costs:
* C10,669,800 (approximately $14,142,300) was allotted to the Judici-
ary (comprised of the Pre-Trial, Trial, and Appeals Divisions);
* E26,598,000 (approximately $35,254,300) was allotted to the Office
of the Prosecutor;
* C61,611,400 (approximately $81,662,800) was allotted to the Regis-
try (which is responsible for non-judicial aspects of the Court, including
duties related to defense, victims and witnesses, outreach, and deten-
tion)."
Thus, trial-related costs in 2010 consumed roughly 95% of the ICC's yearly
budget. That same year, however, the ICC presided over just three active trials:
those of Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo appear-
ing in a joint trial, and Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo.54 By December 2010, two of
these trials had extended beyond one full year.5 5
Yet a "guilty plea before the beginning of the trial obviates the need for vic-
tims and witnesses to give evidence and may save considerable time, effort and
49. Rauxloh's Plea Bargaining, supra note 3, at 10.
50. Scharf, supra note 11, at 1076.
51. Assembly of State Parties Res. ICC-ASP/9/Res. 4, Programme budget for 2011, the Working
Capital Fund for 2011, Scale of Assessments for the Apportionment of Expenses of the International
Criminal Court, Financing Appropriations for 2011 and the Contingency Fund, 9th Sess. (Dec. 10,
2010), available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/asp-docs/Resolutions/ICC-ASP-9-Res.4-ENG.pdf
[hereinafter ICC Budget 2010].
52. The ICC Budget 2010 report was released on December 10, 2010. According to OANDA
(http://www.oanda.com/), the foreign exchange rate on that day valued C1.32545 for every one U.S.
dollar [USD] (every USD amount included here was calculated by the author using the exchange rate,
available at http://www.oanda.com/currency/converter (last visited Sept. 28, 2011)).
53. ICC Budget 2010, supra note 51, at 30.
54. Lubanga's trial commenced on January 26, 2009, Katanga and Ngudjolo's trial commenced on
November 24, 2009, and Bemba's trial commenced on November 22, 2010. All trials continued
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resources."56 Plea bargaining thus provides a legitimate alternative to trials that
would otherwise become incredibly lengthy and costly. The time freed by a plea
bargain can then be used to extend the Court's reach to a greater number of perpe-
trators through new investigations and trials, and the conserved resources can be
diverted to equally as beneficial tasks such as investigations and counsel fees.
Furthermore, the resources preserved through plea bargaining can be used to
fund the reparation of victims. Rauxloh is correct in noting that "so far neither the
UN nor any member state [of the ICC] has ever diverted money from their budget
for court contributions to the victims' support."57 Yet Rauxloh speaks with unwar-
ranted certainty because this history does not preclude the diversion of funds to
victim reparations. Instead there exists an immense need for such funding, as in
2010 only C1,205,200 (approximately $1,597,430) of the ICC's budget was desig-
nated to the Secretariat of the Trust Fund for Victims. Given that atrocities such
as crimes against humanity or genocide often affect hundreds of thousands of
victims, this limited sum is obviously insufficient. Plea bargaining would thus
enable the Court to better provide for the needs of these victims related to such
issues as healthcare and relocation costs.
The use of plea bargaining in one case might also help the Court to preserve
its resources in a second case: "As is often highlighted by the Prosecution, guilty
pleas can substantially assist in its investigations and presentation of evidence at
trials of other accused . . . [as the accused may be willing to offer their assistance
and knowledge to] testify in other proceedings."59 Often the accused agrees to
testify in other cases or provide extensive interviews, obviating the need for the
Court to pursue other witnesses or investigations. As a result, "more justice is
achieved because otherwise unavailable evidence against the most serious offend-
ers is gained."a0
2. Plea Bargaining Enhances the Court's Judicial Reach to a Greater
Number of Perpetrators
As discussed above, the preservation of resources can be used by the Court to
extend its judicial reach to a greater number of perpetrators. The history of the
ICTY reveals the capacity of plea bargaining to clear a court's docket, as the
"twelve plea agreements made at the ICTY between 2001 and 2003 helped to
clear 40% of [its] caseload . . . .",' The time freed by plea bargains can then be
used by the Court to pursue and try other perpetrators who might otherwise have
escaped prosecution. While the ICC is a permanent court and is thus not under the
same time constraints as ad hoc tribunals, it can still "be expected [that the ICC
will] be overburdened quite soon."62 Given the "link between guilty pleas and the
56. Prosecutor v. Plav~ii6, Case No. IT-00-39&40/1-S, Sentencing Judgment, 1 66 (Int'l Crim. Trib.
for the Former Yugoslavia Feb. 27, 2003).
57. Rauxloh's Plea Bargaining, supra note 3, at 12.
58. ICC Budget 2010, supra note 51, at 30.
59. Prosecutor v. Nikoli6, Case No. IT-02-60/1-S, Sentencing Judgment, 1[71 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for
the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 2, 2003).
60. Rauxloh's Plea Bargaining, supra note 3, at 18.
61. Id. at lH.
62. Id. at 12.
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expeditiousness with which cases are dealt with,"63 plea bargains are a viable
option for helping the ICC to manage its caseload.
This will also allow the ICC to operate beyond its current "big-fish" approach
"of only investigating and prosecuting the planners or instigators of the atroci-
ties,"64 thereby eliminating the mentality of immunity which is common amongst
low-level perpetrators, who feel safe "return[ing] to their villages and assum[ing]
positions of power." 65 Instead the ICC would serve as a forum for justice of perpe-
trators at all levels, thus eradicating the hierarchy of crimes and conveying that no
perpetrator's actions will be deemed so insignificant as to escape prosecution.
This message will be instrumental in helping the ICC to foster a sense of
peace both in conflict areas and amongst the victims themselves. It is argued that a
"few convictions, by themselves, do not necessarily change the sentiments of the
populations regarding the violations, or even directly help the victims."' Yet, the
ICC's unrelenting pursuit of all perpetrators would allow affected communities to
rebuild upon a foundation of peace and justice. Victims would no longer be forced
to live amongst their tormenters, nor with the fear that further atrocities may be
committed. Instead, victims would be better able to trust in their neighbors and in
the international community's prioritization of seeking justice for their suffering.
3. Plea Bargaining Serves the Interests of the Victims
It was the needs of victims that dictated the dual goals of peace and justice for
international criminal tribunals, as the mere attainment of "[p]eace without justice
... does not seem to provide a long-term solution."6
With regards to justice, often victims most desire "a true accounting of the
violations and some kind of prosecutions or acknowledgment from that time."
The plea bargaining process provides victims with such acknowledgement, not
only from the Courts but also from the perpetrators themselves: "When defendants
plead guilty they thereby accept responsibility for their actions . . . ."69 This is
perhaps a more meaningful experience than that provided by a guilty verdict, as
the perpetrator is personally acknowledging his or her role in the atrocities rather
than claiming innocence or attempting to justify his or her actions. This was cer-
tainly the sentiment expressed by victim Emir Suljagid, who said of the guilty
pleas entered by Dragan Obrenovi6 and Momir Nikoli: "'[T]he confessions have
brought me a sense of relief I have not known since the fall of Srebrenica in 1995.
They have given me the acknowledgement I have been looking for these past
eight years'."70
These acknowledgements are also instrumental to fostering a sense of peace,
as judges at the ICTY have "made a positive link between guilty pleas and recon-
63. Clark, supra note 24, at 419.
64. Schneider, supra note 4, at 807.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 803.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 804.
69. Clark, supra note 24, at 428.
70. Id. at 429 (citing Prosecutor v. Obrenovid, Case No. IT-02-60/2-S, Sentencing Judgment, I 12
(Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 10, 2003)).
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ciliation."7 ' Guilty pleas have "considerable potential to bring closure to victims
and enable them to forgive," 72 as they allow for "deep-seated resentments-key
obstacles to reconciliation-[to be] removed and [for] people on different sides of
the divide [to] feel that a clean slate has been provided for."73 With the closure
provided by guilty pleas, victims are better able to heal and rebuild.
Guilty pleas not only provide victims with the acknowledgement of their suf-
fering they so often desire, but they also spare victims the trauma of trial:
The advantage most often quoted is that an admission of guilt spares the
victims the ordeal of a trial. A trial means that the witness has to travel a
long way from home to a foreign country to testify and moreover, testify-
ing at court might put the safety of the witness and their families at risk.
Most importantly, at trial the victims might have to relive the trauma
when giving testimony ... .74
While some victims prefer to testify at trial, this is not sufficient justification for
the total elimination of plea bargaining in international tribunals. Instead these
victims may be given the opportunity to share their story in other forums, such as
truth and reconciliation commissions. This would accordingly spare other victims
the trauma of testifying at trial.
C. A Rebuttal to Critics of Plea Bargaining
Despite the growing use of plea bargaining before international criminal tri-
bunals, there exists a vocal community of critics who oppose the integration of
this process with ICL. These critics most frequently assert that plea bargaining in
the context of ICL is unable to attain the tribunals' dual goals of peace and justice.
However valid these arguments may seem at first, greater reflection reveals their
multiple flaws. Accordingly, these critics have failed to provide sufficient justifi-
cation for the elimination of plea bargaining at the ICC.
1. Plea Bargaining is the Best Option for Assisting the Court to Manage
its Overburdened Docket
The Tribunals have long sought alternative methods for managing their judi-
cial workloads. The ICTY first withdrew its indictments against several low-level
officials, and then requested the addition of twenty-seven ad litem judges to assist
the eleven judges assigned to the Tribunal. The Tribunal later "implemented
procedural elements found in continental systems in an effort to make [its] pro-
71. Id. at 423.
72. Combs, supra note 10, at 150.
73. Kingsley Chiedu Moghalu, Reconciling Fractured Societies: An African Perspective on the Role
of Judicial Prosecutions, in FROM SOVEREIGN IMPUNITY TO INTERNATIONAL ACCOUNTABILITY: THE
SEARCH FOR JUSTICE IN A WORLD OF STATES 216 (Ramesh Chandra Thakur & Peter Malcontent eds.,
2004).
74. Rauxloh's Plea Bargaining, supra note 3, at 12.
75. Scharf, supra note 11, at 1076-77.
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ceedings quicker and more efficient."76 The ICTR employed similar methods to
address its growing caseload, first attempting to "combine related cases ... [by
filing] joint indictments and motions for joinder of defendants to consolidate sev-
eral indictments into a single trial,"77 and later dropping indictments against junior
officials and adopting amendments to its RPE which mimicked continental sys-
tems.
While these tactics likely helped the Tribunals to manage their dockets, "none
of these reforms, however efficacious, can compare to the dispatch with which a
guilty plea disposes of a case . . . ."7 International criminal trials instead remain
incredibly lengthy, costly, and taxing on the courts. Yet the plea bargaining proc-
ess significantly relieves the Tribunals of such pressures by eliminating the need
to host full trials for each defendant. This frees a considerable portion of the Tri-
bunals' resources and thus extends their judicial reach to a greater number of al-
leged perpetrators. While some argue that plea bargaining does not truly secure
justice,
victims need to realize that every trial bears the risk that even a guilty
person might be acquitted because the Prosecution could not prove their
case. In international criminal law .. . investigation is extremely difficult
and this risk cannot be underestimated. In this sense, plea bargaining
which secures an admission of guilt is in the interest of justice because a
conviction of only a few charges and a reduced sentence might be prefer-
able to an acquittal after trial.o
Thus plea bargaining ensures greater accountability for global atrocities and pro-
vides victims with a platform for recovery and peace. As such, critics of plea bar-
gaining should acknowledge the wisdom of the Tribunals in endorsing plea bar-
gaining as a highly effective method of managing overburdened trial dockets.
2. Plea Bargaining Does Not Impair the Historical Record of an Atrocity
International criminal tribunals are meant to uncover the truth about global
atrocities ' and to "generate a comprehensive record of the nature and extent of
[such atrocities] . . . Critics argue that plea bargaining can be detrimental to
these functions, as "plea-bargaining that results in the dropping of charges has the
effect of editing out the full factual basis upon which a conviction rests and thus
has the potential to distort the historic record generated by the Tribunal[s]." 83
76. Id. at 1077.
77. Combs, supra note 10, at 93.
78. Id. at 94.
79. Id. at 143.
80. Rauxloh's Plea Bargaining, supra note 3, at 6.
81. See Prosecutor v. Draien Erdemovi6, Case No. IT-96-22-Tbis, Second Sentencing Judgment,
21 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Mar. 5, 1998) (asserting that "[d]iscovering the truth is
a cornerstone of the rule of law and a fundamental step on the way to reconciliation . .
82. Scharf, supra note 11, at 1079.
83. Id. at 1081; see also Combs, supra note 10, at 146 ("Because charge bargaining virtually always
distorts the factual basis upon which a conviction rests, its use would severely undermine [the Tribu-
nals' purpose of providing a historical record].").
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However, plea bargaining can be incredibly beneficial to the creation of a
truthful record. In pleading guilty, defendants both acknowledge that certain
atrocities occurred and also their own involvement in promoting such violence.
This is hugely important to advancing the goals of peace and justice, as "the truth
cannot have a positive effect unless it is acknowledged. "84 Take for example the
Plavgi6 case before the ICTY: "[N]ot only did PlavWi plead guilty to the charge of
persecution, but she also admitted the facts surrounding the charge in a five-page
document that was appended to the plea agreement."85 Such admissions are of
great value, as the global community and former victims are more likely to believe
a historical record formed from such willing admissions than those formed from
the trial transcripts of defendants asserting their innocence.
Such admissions further benefit the creation of a historical record by provid-
ing insights that the global community might otherwise have missed: "[P]lea
agreements can generate a contribution to the historical record of inestimable
value-the indispensable perspective of the perpetrator." 87 Defendants thus offer
victims not only their own admission of guilt, but also an understanding of their
motivations and why such atrocities were committed. In doing so, defendants are
also "undercut[ting] the ability of future revisionists to distort empirically what
happened"" by creating an official record of their admissions.
Some may argue that such records are less beneficial than the thousands of
pages often produced by international criminal trials. 89 Yet this argument disre-
gards that
[e]ven if the documentation accompanying plea agreements lacks the de-
tails of a full trial record, the efficiency of the plea agreement process re-
sults in a greater number of completed cases and, therefore, more addi-
tions to the historical record. Plea agreements can therefore make up in
breadth what they may lack in depth.90
Accordingly, plea bargaining offers unique benefits to the process of creating a
historical record that even full trials are incapable of offering.
84. Clark, supra note 24, at 426.
85. Scharf, supra note 11, at 1079.
86. Id. (analyzing public response to the Nuremberg trials and finding "[tihus, from the perspective
of developing a generally accepted historic record, a plea-bargain may be more effective than a judg-
ment developed via a full international trial in the face of the denials of the defendant.").
87. Alan Tieger & Milbert Shin, Plea Agreements in the ICTY Purpose, Effects and Propriety, 3 J.
INT'L CRIM. JUST. 666, 671 (2005).
88. Prosecutor v. Deronji6, Case No. IT-02-61-S, Sentencing Judgment, 1 260 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for
the Former Yugoslavia Mar. 30, 2004).
89. See Rauxloh's Negotiated History, supra note 2, at 752 ("Biljana Plavgi6, when pleading guilty,
did not reveal any new facts but merely confirmed the statement the Prosecutor had submitted in a
short five-page document. In comparison, a judgment (sic) of the ICTY tends to comprise several
hundreds of pages and trial transcripts run into tens of thousands of pages in addition to witness state-
ments, official documents and other evidence.").
90. Tieger & Shin, supra note 87, at 671.
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3. Plea Bargaining Does Not Sacrifice Justice
There are also those who argue that the concessions made by a prosecutor
during plea bargaining sacrifice the achievement of justice in cases of ICL: "If the
Prosecutor makes a plea agreement such that the totality of an individual's crimi-
nal conduct is not reflected or the remaining charges do not sufficiently reflect the
gravity of the offences committed by the accused, questions may arise as to
whether justice is in fact being done." 91 As evidence these critics point to the leni-
ency seen in such cases as that of Plavgii, whose genocide charges were dropped
and who was ultimately sent to serve her sentence in a Swedish prison "which
offered inmates access to [a] sauna, gym, solarium, massage room, and horse-
riding paddock." 92
Yet this argument disregards the critical role of international condemnation in
securing justice for victims, as a defendant's sentence is equally as important as
the Tribunals' acknowledgement of atrocities and the perpetrators' roles therein.
While plea bargaining might reduce the severity of a defendant's sentence, it does
not override the public condemnation of the court, particularly as judges at the
international tribunals frequently issue opinions to accompany their admission of
guilty pleas. Accordingly, "[njot only the sentence but also the judgment and its
inherent condemnation by the international community are essential parts of jus-
tice." 9
Furthermore, the withdrawal of certain charges does not necessarily represent
the Court's willingness to ignore certain crimes as committed by the defendant.
As shown by the Todorovid case, "[a]lthough on the surface, the withdrawal of
twenty-six of the twenty-seven counts would seem a substantial prosecutorial
concession, in fact, it had limited significance because the one count to which
Todorovi6 pled guilty encompassed the offenses contained in the other twenty-six
counts." 94 Accordingly, Todorovid's guilty plea to one charge of persecution as a
crime against humanity embodied his admission of guilt to all allegations origi-
nally contained in twenty-seven separate counts.
Critics also discount the fact that prosecutors must work within the sentencing
confines established by the Tribunal. The sentencing range of the ICC is "already
perceived by some as too low," 95 as the Rome Statute does not provide for the
death penalty and only allows life imprisonment to be assigned in exceptional
circumstances. 96 While these restrictions are lenient on their own, they also place
91. Nikolid, Case No. IT-02-60/1-S (Dec. 2, 2003).
92. Rauxloh's Plea Bargaining, supra note 3, at 7 (citing Patrick McLoughlin, Jail With "Human
Touch" May Await Bosnia's Plavsic, REUTERS, June 6, 2003, available at
http://www.freerepublic.con/focus/f-news/924094/posts (last visited on May 29, 2011)).
93. Rauxloh's Plea Bargaining, supra note 3, at 6.
94. Combs, supra note 10, at 120.
95. Rauxloh's Plea Bargaining, supra note 3, at 14.
96. Article77 of the Rome Statute reads:
1. Subject to article 110, the Court may impose one of the following penalties on a person con-
victed of a crime referred to in article 5 of this Statute:
(a) Imprisonment for a specified number of years, which may not exceed a maximum of 30
years; or
(b) A term of life imprisonment when justified by the extreme gravity of the crime and the
individual circumstances of the convicted person.
2. In addition to imprisonment, the Court may order:
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stringent limits on the capacity of a prosecutor to bargain with a defendant. The
appeal for most defendants in seeking a plea bargain is the hope of securing a
more lenient sentence. When the sentencing maximum is fairly minimal, prosecu-
tors are thus forced to reduce a defendant's sentence even further. Thus the cri-
tique that prosecutors offer unjustly lax sentences is misdirected because the prob-
lem of leniency stems from the Rome Statute itself and not the improperly gra-
cious nature of the Court in addressing guilty pleas.
There is one final party who is often overlooked in arguments pertaining to
plea bargaining and justice: the defendant. International tribunals seek to attain
both peace and justice, yet they do not seek justice on behalf of only one party.
Instead, to maintain the integrity of the judicial process, these courts must ensure
that fairness and justice is achieved for all parties including defendants. The plea
bargaining process is one such method of extending justice to those defendants
who, for example, are innocent but unable or unwilling to endure the great lengths
and cost of a trial, or who are unsure that they will attain justice during trial:
"[T]he choice is between permitting innocents to plead under the most favorable
circumstances possible and forcing them to trial, where they risk vastly greater
punishment."97 Plea bargaining thus allows defendants to have a more active voice
in determining the outcome of their case and in protecting the fairness of their
judicial process. As such, plea bargaining does not hinder the pursuit of justice by
the courts, and instead offers unique benefits to the courts in securing justice for
all parties.
IV. FITTING THE PLEA BARGAINING PROCESS TO THE INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL COURT'S FRAMEWORK
The ICTY and the ICTR have demonstrated that plea bargaining would offer
a "valuable contribution"98 to the ICC's success in securing peace and justice. Yet
the histories of these Tribunals also convey the lack of definitive standards with
regards to the exercise of plea bargaining in ICL. Rather than work towards an
established set of principles, each Tribunal has instead "developed forms of plea
bargaining that reflect their unique procedural amalgam, institutional structure,
and wide-ranging goals."9 However, the implementation of plea bargaining be-
fore the ICC necessitates a different approach, since "if a court decides to develop
the practice of plea [bargaining] it has to establish some long-term strategy." 1a
The ICTY and the ICTR offer little guidance in this regard, as the needs of
these ad hoc tribunals vary from those of the permanent ICC. However, the nature
of plea bargaining suggests that its implementation at the ICC may instead be
guided by another area of the law. Given that plea bargaining constitutes a form of
(a) A fine under the criteria provided for in the Rules of Procedure and Evidence;
(b) A forfeiture of proceeds, property and assets derived directly or indirectly from that
crime, without prejudice to the rights of bona fide third parties.
Rome Statute, supra note 6, art. 77.
97. Robert E. Scott & William J. Stuntz, A Reply: Imperfect Bargains, Imperfect Trials, and Inno-
cent Defendants, 101 YALE L.J. 2011, 2013 (1992).
98. Rauxloh's Plea Bargaining, supra note 3, at 2.
99. Combs, supra note 10, at 154.
100. Rauxloh's Negotiated History, supra note 2, at 763.
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negotiation, the ICC should thus look to the principles of ADR in devising its
internal plea bargaining structure. The principles of ADR provide an appropriate
reference point for the ICC, as "plea bargaining advances the goal of conflict reso-
lution"' 0 1 in such a way as to "[allow] the parties to resolve a criminal prosecution
in a way that best meets their needs .. 102
As such, efforts to implement plea bargaining at the ICC should be guided by
the principles of ADR. The doctrine of DSD will first help the ICC to plot its pri-
mary goals for an internal plea bargaining system. The Court should then examine
the core principles of ADR to determine what qualities of the domestic structure
translate to its own international system. Such an analysis will foster a better un-
derstanding of the function of plea bargaining in the context of ICL, and inform
the creation of a system that combines the unique roles and objectives of ADR
with those of the ICC.
A. Dispute System Design
In undertaking the adoption of its plea bargaining system the ICC should first
look to the principles of DSD, which provide a method "by which to measure the
success or effectiveness of any system created to resolve disputes."' 03 Plea bar-
gaining serves as an alternative method of resolving disputes to full trials. As
such, the ICC should craft its plea bargaining system around the goals of DSD to
ensure that its finalized structure is as functional as possible.
In evaluating its plea bargaining structure against the principles of DSD, the
ICC should ask the following questions:
1. Why was the system established? In other words, what is the specific
purpose of the proposed system, and does the system further those pur-
poses?'0 4
2. Who gets to participate in the system/who has rights? In making this
analysis, DSD principles call for "the structure [to] strive for inclusive-
ness, broad coverage of the conflict issues, and depth of jurisdiction." 05
3. Does the system reflect the community for which it is being estab-
lished? Accordingly, the system should "vest control over decisions in
those most interested and affected by those decisions."'06
4. Does the system reflect the lessons ofpast experience?i0 7
In applying these questions to the context of the ICC, some provide more obvious
guidance than others. For instance, the proposed plea bargaining process at the
101. Combs, supra note 10, at 56.
102. Id.
103. Schneider, supra note 4, at 799.
104. Id. ("[Tihe first question to ask is why the system was established. This question helps to iden-
tify the system's specific purpose or purposes. In answering this question as regards international
adjudication, one must address whether consensual dispute resolution furthers that purpose.").
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id. ("A final principal of DSD [is] learning from experience. .
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ICC should serve to achieve "an end to the violence, justice for the victims, and
perhaps even reconciliation . . . .',0o Similarly, the ICC's existence as an interna-
tional criminal tribunal inherently designates the Court's judges, prosecutors,
defendants, and defense counsel as participants who may engage in the plea bar-
gaining process and have rights as such.
However, the ICC's specific goals with regards to the third and fourth ques-
tions cannot be so easily presumed. For example, the ICC cannot be said to repre-
sent just one specific community because it was designed to represent multiple
networks including the international legal community and multiple communities
of victims. This gives rise to an important question regarding the participation of
victims in plea bargaining. The third query of DSD implies that a plea bargaining
system should be designed such that control is vested in those most interested in
and affected by the Court's decisions. Victims arguably represent the community
most interested in and affected by the sentencing of defendants, and Article 68 of
the Rome Statute provides for their voices to be heard during proceedings:
Where the personal interests of the victims are affected, the Court shall
permit their views and concerns to be presented and considered at stages
of the proceedings determined to be appropriate by the Court and in a
manner which is not prejudicial to or inconsistent with the rights of the
accused and a fair and impartial trial. Such views and concerns may be
presented by the legal representatives of the victims where the Court con-
siders it appropriate, in accordance with the Rules of Procedure and Evi-
dence. 109
Thus in utilizing the guidance of DSD, the ICC must determine to what extent the
provisions of Rule 68 should be integrated into a plea bargaining system.
Furthermore, the ICC must undertake an initial analysis of the ICTY's and the
ICTR's past plea bargaining efforts. In doing so, the Court can identify which
successes of the Tribunals can be transferred to its own system and what lessons
can be taken from the Tribunals' past failures. Accordingly, the principles of DSD
provide the ICC with an early roadmap for identifying those "integrated and crea-
tive processes" 110 that will best "provide multiple remedies and meet the goals of
victims, societies, and the international community."]11
B. Participants as Negotiators
Once the ICC has utilized the principles of DSD to plot its overall goals for
an internal plea bargaining system, the Court should add greater definition to the
structure of this system using the principles of ADR. This will be particularly
useful to the ICC in asserting the methodologies of its prosecutors in their en-
gagement of plea bargaining.
108. Id.
109. Rome Statute, supra note 6, art. 68(3).
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"Negotiation" is the process whereby two or more parties explore potential
options for resolving a conflict or dispute without the assistance of an impartial
supervising party. 112 Plea bargaining is one such method in representing a "nego-
tiated agreement between a prosecutor and a criminal defendant whereby the de-
fendant pleads guilty to a lesser offense or to one of multiple charges in exchange
for some concession by the prosecutor . 1.. ."" Thus, the ICC should use the prin-
ciples of negotiation as markers for its employees' methodologies as they engage
in plea bargaining with defense counsel.
There are three predominant approaches to negotiation: the competitive bar-
gaining approach,'14 the cooperative bargaining approach," 5 and the integrative
bargaining approach."' 6 The integrative bargaining approach is the most applica-
ble to bargaining at the ICC, as it primarily frames negotiations as an opportunity
for mutual gain. In doing so, negotiators utilize objective criteria, create condi-
tions of mutual gain, and emphasize the importance of exchanging information
between parties and group problem-solving.117
Combining such methodology with its "roots in international relations,""' in-
tegrative bargaining thus provides an appropriate framework for a plea bargaining
system that unites the "analogous goals [of ICL and ADR] increased voice, proce-
dural justice, and fairness . . . .""9 Although it has been argued that integrative
bargaining is less effective when parties' interests are inherently opposed such as
in cases of plea bargaining,120 the opportunity for mutual gain is exponentially
112. See DAVID SPENCER & MICHAEL BROGAN, MEDIATION LAW AND PRACTICE 9 (2006) ("Negotia-
tion is the process whereby two or more parties work through their conflict or dispute . .. with a view
to coming to some agreement, or settlement, about that conflict or dispute."); AM. BAR ASS'N, SEC. OF
DisP. RESOL., WHAT YOU NEED TO KNOW ABOUT DISPUTE RESOLUTION: THE GUIDE TO DISPUTE
RESOLUTION PROCESSES (2006), available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/abal
migrated/2011_build/dispute-resolution/draftbrochure.authcheckdam.pdf ("Negotiation is a voluntary
and usually informal process in which parties identify issues of concern, explore options for the resolu-
tion of the issues, and search for a mutually acceptable agreement to resolve the issues raised. The
disputing parties may be represented by attorneys in negotiation. Negotiation is different from media-
tion in that there is no neutral individual to assist the parties negotiate.").
113. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1270 (9th ed. 2009).
114. The competitive bargaining approach, also known as the adversarial, distributive, or position
approach, refers to "a negotiator who is primarily concerned with 'winning' the negotiation," who is
more likely to engage in negative tactics, and who is less likely to show interest in the other side's
point of view. CARRIE MENKEL-MEADOW ET AL., DISPUTE RESOLUTION: BEYOND THE ADVERSARIAL
MODEL 93 (2d ed. 2011) [hereinafter DISPUTE RESOLUTION].
115. The cooperative bargaining approach, also known as the accommodating or "soft" approach,
"focuses on relationships and on working with the other side."
116. The integrative bargaining approach, also known as the collaborative or principled approach,
occurs to a negotiation "in which the negotiator is interested in doing well for herself and her client and
in working with the other side to meet that party's interests. Some call this the 'joint gain' model of
negotiation."
117. TANYA ALFREDSON & AZETA CUNGU', FOOD AND AGRICULTURE ORGANIZATION OF THE
UNITED NATIONS, NEGOTIATION THEORY AND PRACTICE: A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE (Jan. 2008),
available at http://www.fao.org/docs/up/easypol/550/4-5_Negotiation-background paper 179EN.pdf.
118. Id.
119. Schneider, supra note 4, at 821-22. Schneider also asserts that a court-connected ADR system
would be unsuccessful unless settlements are "based on [the] core values of justice and equality." Id.
at 818.
120. See Donald G. Gifford, A Context-Based Theory of Strategy Selection in Legal Negotiation, 46
OHIO ST. L.J. 41, 56-57 (1985) ("[Integrative bargaining] is less useful when the parties disagree on
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higher in cases of ICL, where all parties are likely concerned with securing an
outcome that encourages peace and rehabilitation in affected regions.
Accordingly, parties to plea bargaining at the ICC should be guided by the
principles of integrative bargaining. These parties will thus represent "principled
negotiator[s]" who work towards a final outcome that satisfies the needs of all
parties. As such, these principled negotiators will operate according to four key
strategies, as outlined by Professors Roger Fisher and William Ury:
"People: Separate the people from the problem.
Interests: Focus on interests, not positions.
Options: Generate a variety of possibilities before deciding what to do.
Criteria: Insist that the result be based on some objective standard." 12'
Under these strategies, principled negotiators will "attempt to separate the inter-
personal relationship between the negotiators from the merits of the problem or
conflict" 22 while promoting the "free exchange of information between the nego-
tiators so that each party's motives, goals, and values are understood and appreci-
ated." 23 With regards to the fourth strategy, Fisher and Ury have further defined
an "objective criteria when the parties' interests seem to directly conflict and no
mutually advantageous solution appears to be available."1 24 In these situations,
negotiators should "[flrame each issue as a joint search for objective criteia ...
[r]eason and be open to reason as to which standards are most appropriate and
how they should be applied ... and [n]ever yield to pressure, only to principle."l25
Given the known success of integrative bargaining in attaining similar goals to
those of the ICC, the Court should train its prosecutors to primarily engage in such
methods when conducting plea negotiations with defense counsel.
C. The Principles of Alternative Dispute Resolution
The goal of both international adjudication and ADR "is to find a proce-
durally just process that can produce satisfactory results." 12 This shared goal
enables the ICC to transfer several aspects of negotiation to its own adjudication-
based framework. In adopting certain methods of negotiation, the Court will thus
ensure the procedural justice of its final plea bargaining structure.
In crafting its internal bargaining structure, the ICC should first seek to emu-
late ADR's dual emphasis on restorative and retributive justice. A superficial
comparison suggests that these two theories pose a direct challenge to one an-
other, as restorative justice emphasizes the healing of victims and repairing of
only a single issue and the parties' interests are inherently opposed. Examples of such situations that
present direct conflicts include . . . plea bargaining.").
121. Id. at 55 (referencing ROGER FISHER & WILLIAM URY, GETTING TO YES: NEGOTIATING
AGREEMENT WITHOUT GIVING IN 11 (1981)).
122. Id.
123. Gifford, supra note 120, at 55.
124. Id. at 57.
125. Id. (referencing Fisher and Ury, supra note 121, at 91).
126. Schneider, supra note 4, at 796.
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harm causedl 27 while retributive justice emphasizes the punishment of alleged
perpetrators.128 However, the fluidity of ADR enables negotiators to achieve an
outcome that simultaneously represents both strands of justice, as "the major out-
come of restorative justice is reflected in mutual acceptance of and compliance
with the negotiated reparation agreement,"1 29 while the outcome of retributive
justice rests more with the symbolic punishment of a violator of international
norms and values.130 These theories draw a distinct parallel to the ICC's primary
goals of achieving peace and justice, and their subsequent outcomes mirror the
Court's presumed motives for implementing plea bargaining. Thus in moving
forward, the ICC should adopt the ADR tenet that restorative and retributive jus-
tice can be equally represented and attained during negotiations.
Procedural justice in ADR is also ensured through the use of model codes of
conduct.131 These codes govern the conduct of counsel in the execution of their
professional duties, and regulate such matters as a lawyer's truthfulness in state-
ments to othersl 32 and his or her competence in representing clients.'3 The ICC
should similarly adopt this tool of ADR by drafting its own guidelines regarding
the conduct of negotiators appearing before the Court, and further include a writ-
ten set of procedures regarding its plea bargaining process. In crafting its own
code of conduct the ICC can ensure that all negotiators remain aware of, and
compliant with, its uniform set of standards. By also crafting a written set of plea
bargaining procedures, the ICC can better protect its unique functions and goals as
an international criminal tribunal while directly addressing the challenges of plea
bargaining in ICL.134
The ICC may also benefit from the constructions of ADR that are related to
matters others than procedural justice. For example, many methods of ADR are
designed to facilitate victim participation, as "[d]ispute resolution offers parties as
least a perception of substantive control through the ability to speak for them-
127. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 113, at 1248 (defining restorative justice as "[aln
alternative . . . sanction that focuses on repairing the harm done, meeting the victim's needs, and hold-
ing the offender responsible . . .").
128. See Lisa Blomgren Bingham, Designing Justice: Legal Institutions and Other Systems for Man-
aging Conflict, 24 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 1, 41 (2008) ("Retributive justice is related to justice as
vengeance or punishment. . .").
129. RESTORATIVE JUSTICE ON TRIAL: PITFALLS AND POTENTIALS OF VICTIM-OFFENDER
MEDIATION-INTERNATIONAL RESEARCH PERSPECTIvES 2 (Heinz Messmer & Hans-Uwe Otto eds.,
1992).
130. Id. at 319 (arguing the "retributive paradigm focuses on the violation of norms and values. This
retributive approach follows a breach of penal law . .. such a consideration is incidental to a justice
system that essentially has a symbolic character aimed at the whole of society.").
131. See generally MODEL STANDARDS OF CONDUCT FOR MEDIATORS (2005), available at
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/dispute/documents/model-standards-conduct_
april2007.authcheckdam.pdf; MODEL RULES OF PROFL CONDUCT (2002), available at
http://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional-responsibility/publications/model-rules-of-professio
nal conduct/model-rules of professional-conduct table of contents.html.
132. See MODEL RULES OF PROFL CONDUCT, supra note 131, R. 4.1 ("In the course of representing a
client a lawyer shall not knowingly:(a) make a false statement of material fact or law to a third person;
or (b) fail to disclose a material fact to a third person when disclosure is necessary to avoid assisting a
criminal or fraudulent act by a client, unless disclosure is prohibited by Rule 1.6.").
133. See generally MODEL STANDARDS OF CONDUCT FOR MEDIATORS, supra note 131, R. 4.
134. For example, the ICC could draft procedures related to such issues as language barriers amongst
negotiators or the performance of negotiations with counsel located abroad.
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selves and be heard in a respectful manner."' 35 While the degree of victim partici-
pation may vary given the method of ADR they are pursuing and the individual
facts of their case, the majority of methods grant victims a voice within the sys-
tem. Such an approach aligns with the victim-centric tone of ICL.
This emphasis on victim participation has not always translated to the plea
bargaining processes of international criminal tribunals, however. Instead, victims
often remain uninformed about the guilty pleas entered by defendants, or are only
informed about the status of defendants from their regions.136 To prevent such
errors from damaging its own plea bargaining system, the ICC should look to the
methods employed under ADR to ensure proper victim participation and adopt
them to suit the needs of the Court. While it is unrealistic to presume that the ICC
could involve all victims in its plea negotiations, there are certainly options for
keeping victim participation as intact as possible, such as the inclusion of victim
advocates in plea negotiations who may represent the victims' voice and serve as
the liaison between the victims and the Court.
The ICC may also look to the interactions of domestic courts and ADR for
guidance on proper procedural safeguards. Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Crimi-
nal Procedure (FRCP) dictates the criteria for a domestic court's acceptance of a
guilty plea.' 37 These criteria are closely mimicked by the bargaining guidelines
established by the ICTY138 and the ICTR.139 The ICC should adopt similar guide-
lines into its own RPE, thus protecting the integrity of all guilty pleas accepted by
the Court by assuring that all pleas are voluntary, informed, unequivocal, and
based in fact.
Mimicking the division of power enforced by both domestic and international
courts may further protect the integrity of the ICC's plea bargaining process.
There is a clear division of power in U.S. court systems, as prosecutors engage in
plea negotiations and determine the provisions thereof, but judges have final ap-
135. Schneider, supra note 4, at 791.
136. Clark, supra note 24, at 432 ("What is more, while [victims] often knew about the guilty plea of
a defendant from their own area, the interviewees were completely uninformed about other such pleas.
. ."). One such example is that of Dugan Fugtar, who was indicted by the ICTY in 1995 and transferred
to the State Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina [Court of BiH] in May 2006. Shortly after his transfer,
Fultar entered plea negotiations with the prosecutor at the Court of BiH. In April 2008, Fugtar was
sentenced to nine years' imprisonment based upon his guilty plea. Yet, it was not until July 2008 that
the prosecutor traveled to the city of Prijedor to speak to victims about Fugtar's plea agreement. Id. at
435-36.
137. FED. R. CRIM. P. I I(b)(2)-(b)(3) (holding that a court cannot accept a defendant's guilty plea
unless (1) the plea was entered voluntarily; and (2) a factual basis exists for the guilty plea).
138. During the trial of Prosecutor v. Erdemovie, the ICTY asserted that guilty pleas could only be
accepted if the plea was entered into voluntarily, knowingly, and unequivocally. See Rauxloh's Nego-
tiated History, supra note 2, at 756 (referencing Prosecutor v. Erdemovi6, Case No. IT-96-22-A, Sepa-
rate and Dissenting Opinion of Judge Cassese, 19 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 7,
1997); See also id. at Joint Separate Opinion of Judge McDonald and Judge Vohrah 18, 10.
139. Article 62(B) of the ICTR RPE holds:
If an accused pleads guilty in accordance with Rule 62 (A)(v), or requests to change his plea to
guilty, the Trial Chamber shall satisfy itself that the guilty plea:
(i) is made freely and voluntarily;
(ii) is an informed plea;
(iii) is unequivocal; and
(iv) is based on sufficient facts for the crime and accused's participation in it, either on the
basis of independent indicia or of lack of any material disagreement between the parties
about the facts of the case. ICTR RPE, supra note 26, art. 62(b).
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proval of guilty pleas and sentencing terms. Both the ICTY 140 and the ICTRI41
adopted similar methods regarding this division of power, as prosecutors engage
in plea negotiations but Trial Chambers "are completely excluded from the plea-
bargaining process, and render the final determination about the appropriateness
of the plea, in particular whether certain charges may be withdrawn, and on the
sentence to be served, taking into account the nature of the plea."4 The ICC
would benefit from exercising a similar division of power, which serves as an
internal system of checks and balances so that no one party can exercise unfet-
tered discretion over defendants' pleas.
Finally, the ICC should examine the methods of enforcement utilized upon
the conclusion of ADR proceedings:
In the United States, we are generally quite sure that the law will be en-
forced. So, even when we use ADR, we know that we are bargaining in
the shadow of a longstanding body of law we can count on. As we create
international systems, we need to think carefully about the underlying le-
gal structures, the law, and how it is implemented.143
As such, domestic courts have recognized their unparalleled capacity to support
the outcomes of ADR processes. Thus the ICC must move forward with a similar
understanding, as the Court would lose both credibility and authority within the
international community if it were to implement a plea bargaining system that it
could not later enforce.
140. Rule 62ter of the ICTY's RPE holds:
(A) The Prosecutor and the defence may agree that, upon the accused entering a plea of guilty to
the indictment or to one or more counts of the indictment, the Prosecutor shall do one or more of
the following before the Trial Chamber:
(i) apply to amend the indictment accordingly;
(ii) submit that a specific sentence or sentencing range is appropriate;
(iii) not oppose a request by the accused for a particular sentence or sentencing range.
(B) The Trial Chamber shall not be bound by any agreement specified in paragraph (A).
(C) If a plea agreement has been reached by the parties, the Trial Chamber shall require the dis-
closure of the agreement in open session or, on a showing of good cause, in closed session, at the
time the accused pleads guilty in accordance with Rule 62 (vi), or requests to change his or her
plea to guilty. ICTY RPE, supra note 23, art. 62ter (Dec. 8, 2010).
141. Rule 62bis of the ICTR's RPE similarly holds:
(A) The Prosecutor and the Defence may agree that, upon the accused entering a plea of guilty to
the indictment or to one or more counts of the indictment, the Prosecutor shall do one or more of
the following before the Trial Chamber:
(i) apply to amend the indictment accordingly;
(ii) submit that a specific sentence or sentencing range is appropriate;
(iii) not oppose a request by the accused for a particular sentence or sentencing range.
(B) The Trial Chamber shall not be bound by any agreement specified in paragraph (A).
(C) If a plea agreement has been reached by the parties, the Trial Chamber shall require the dis-
closure of the agreement in open session or, on a showing of good cause, in closed session, at the
time the accused pleads guilty in accordance with Rule 62 (A) (v), or requests to change his or
her plea to guilty. ICTR RPE, supra note 26, art. 62bis.
142. Rodney Dixon & Alexis Demirdjian, Advising Defendants about Guilty Pleas before Interna
tional Courts, 3 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 680, 683 (2005).
143. Schneider, supra note 4, at 818.
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V. CONCLUSION
No one can deny that international criminal tribunals face tremendous chal-
lenges in securing both peace and justice for victims. The sad reality is that these
challenges have long enabled perpetrators of "[a]trocities that we would . . . label
genocide or crimes against humanity [to go] virtually [un]punished . . . ."A Yet
critics of plea bargaining seek to eliminate one of the few tools made available to
the courts in their pursuit of peace and justice.
These critics need look no further than the ICTY and the ICTR for evidence
speaking to the value of plea bargaining in achieving these goals. Thus as the ICC
continues adding definition to its RPE, it should disregard the voices of such crit-
ics and instead grant deference to the experience of such tribunals as the ICTY
and the ICTR. In doing so, the ICC should craft a series of regulations regarding
the plea bargaining process as applied to its own trials.
In crafting such regulations the ICC should turn to the principles of ADR for
guidance, as plea bargaining constitutes a form of negotiation and thus falls under
the purview of ADR. A thoughtful comparison of ADR and ICL reveals extensive
similarities in their guiding principles. Such a comparison will help to illuminate
the meaning of "plea bargaining" in the context of ICL and further assist the ICC
in creating a functional system for accomplishing peace and justice.
144. Combs, supra note 10, at 154.
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